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Abstract
We develop a consistent nonparametric test of common values in first-price auctions
and apply it to British Columbia Timber Sales data. The test is based on the behavior
of the CDF of bids near the reserve price. We show that the curvature of the CDF is
drastically different under private values (PV) and common values (CV). We then show
that the problem of discriminating between PV and CV is equivalent to estimating
the lower tail index of the bid distribution. Our approach admits unobserved auction
heterogeneity of an arbitrary form. We develop a Hill (1975)-type tail index estimator
and find presence of common values in BC Timber Sales.
Keywords: first-price auctions, common values, private values, tail index, timber
auctions
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1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized that auctions with common values (CV), where buyers
do not know in advance their willingness to pay, are very different from auctions with
private values (PV). For example, a theoretical result of Milgrom and Weber (1982) shows
that in the affiliated value model that allows for both common and private components in
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bidder valuations, an open auction is revenue superior to the first-price, sealed-bid auc-
tion.1 Other policy recommendations differ depending on whether the values are private
or common.2 For example, in a CV environment, the seller may decide to reveal informa-
tion to mitigate the winner’s curse effect. Another concrete example is setting the optimal
reserve price. Our application in this paper is to British Columbia Timber Sales (BCTS).
In British Columbia, the Ministry of Forests has developed a complex system of reserve
prices with the goal of maximizing revenue for the government. As the optimal reserve
price setting depends on the employed model, it is important to know whether a private
or common value model is more appropriate in this application.
This paper develops a consistent (asymptotic power-one) tail-index nonparametric test
for common or private values in first-price auctions and applies it to timber auctions in
British Columbia. This is the first paper we are aware of that uses powerful methods from
the econometric literature on extremes to shed light on an important problem in empirical
industrial organization.
The approach in this paper is inspired by Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter (2003) who
utilize a result in Milgrom and Weber (1982) to show that the behavior of bids around the
reserve price is different under PV and CV.3 Specifically, the lower bound of the support
of the so-called pseudo-values (see Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong, 2000) is equal to r under
PV but is strictly greater than r under CV. We show that under PV, there must be more
clustering of bids near the reserve price than under CV. For independent private values,
an excessive clustering result was previously obtained by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong
(2000) in the context of value density estimation. However, the previous literature has
not considered a formal statistical test of PV versus CV based on the behavior of bids
near the reserve price.
Our innovation is to develop such a test based on the tail index of the bid distribution.
In our application, the tail index gives a measure of bid clustering around the reserve
price. The tail index characterizes the curvature or rate of decay of a CDF in the tail,
1There is also empirical evidence to the importance of this effect, e.g. in Shneyerov (2006).
2In addition, as Laffont and Vuong (1996) have shown, models with common values are often nonpara-
metrically non-identified, while private-value models are often identified.
3A more detailed discussion appears in Hendricks and Porter (2007).
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and is a popular approach to modeling extreme quantiles in economics, finance, insurance
and engineering. See Section 2 for a formal definition, and see Embrechts, Kluppleberg,
and Mikosch (1997), Gabaix (2008) and Davis (2010) for a review on power tails and their
applications. We show that the tail index κ is equal to 1 under CV, and is equal to 1/2
under PV. Under private values, Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) establish this result
only for the IPV case. We show that the tail index is 1/2 whether the private values are
independent or affiliated.4
To our knowledge, existing tests for common values take the null hypothesis to be
that of private values (independent or affiliated) and the alternative to be a model with
a common value component. In many applications, however, there is no paradigm (PV
or CV) that is generally “accepted”. By switching the null and alternative hypotheses,
this paper is the first to propose a test of the null hypothesis that incorporates a CV
component versus a PV alternative.
Milgrom and Weber (1982)’s classic model has been fundamental widely in both theo-
retical and empirical research on auctions, despite the fact that it applies only to the sym-
metric environment. Empirical applications within a symmetric common-value paradigm
include Paarsch (1992) to auctions for tree-planting contracts, Haile (2001) to timber
sales, Hong and Shum (2002) to highway procurement, Hendricks, Pinkse, and Porter
(2003) to off-shore oil, and Shneyerov (2006) to municipal bonds. Within the symmetric
private-value paradigm, applications include Laffont and Vuong (1996) to eggplant auc-
tions in Marmande (France), Krasnokutskaya (2011) to highway procurement, and Li and
Perrigne (2003) to timber sales.
However, it is indisputable that bidder asymmetries are important in a number of
markets. For example, in a seminal paper, Hendricks and Porter (1988) emphasize bidder
asymmetries in sealed-bid auctions for off-shore drainage tracts. Also, within the private-
value paradigm, Bajari and Ye (2003) and Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer (2003) have studied
auctions for highway procurement, Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003) have considered
4The distribution of bids near the reserve price satisfies a power-law, hence is regularly varying. This
evidently marks a rare case of naturally occurring Paretian tails. In the statistics literature many Markov
chains and stochastic recurrence equations are known to exhibit power-law tail decay, including nonlin-
ear GARCH. Consult Embrechts, Kluppleberg, and Mikosch (1997), Gabaix (2008), Hill (2010) and Hill
(2011b) for references.
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off-shore oil auctions, Flambard and Perrigne (2006) - auctions of snow-removal contracts,
while Athey, Levin, and Seira (2011) emphasize asymmetries in timber sales. A question
then arises, to what extent is our tail-index approach robust to bidder asymmetries. We
consider a class of asymmetric models in which, as we show, the tail index is preserved.
The estimation of the tail index is a well-studied problem in statistics and economet-
rics, see Hill (1975), Hsing (1993) and more recently Hill (2010) and Hill (2011b). We
employ a version of Hill’s (1975) celebrated estimator κ̂ of the tail index. The estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal, and is remarkably easy to implement for a one-sided
t-test of PV versus CV. Our test approach works even when there is unobserved auction
heterogeneity, and even if the number of potential bidders is unobservable.5 Further, since
Hill’s (1975) estimator κ̂ exhibits the same stochastic properties under either hypothesis
PV and CV, differing only in the asymptotic mean, our test of CV or PV is consistent: it
obtains an asymptotic power of one against the chosen alternative.
An early approach to testing for common values was to check if bids increase mono-
tonically with the number of potential bidders; a non-monotonic pattern was believed to
provide evidence of common values. This approach was initiated by Gilley and Karels
(1981), and applied to second-price sealed-bid and English auctions by Paarsch (1991)
and Bajari and Hortaçsu (2004). However, Pinkse and Tan (2005) have shown that in
first-price auctions, this pattern can also arise if values are private and affiliated.
The first paper that adopted a structural approach to this problem is Paarsch (1992),
where a parametric testing method is developed and applied to the auctions of tree planting
contracts in BC. The recent literature has focused on nonparametric approaches. Haile,
Hong, and Shum (2003) have proposed a nonparametric test of PV versus CV. Their
approach is entirely different from ours and is based on the variation in the number of
bidders across auctions. They implement their test on a sample of US Forest Service
(USFS) timber auctions and obtain mixed results. Haile, Hong and Shum’s approach does
not require a binding reserve price.6 Recently, Hortaçsu and Kastl (2010) proposed a test
5Krasnokutskaya (2011) has argued for the importance of accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity
in the estimation of auction markups. See also the discussion in Paarsch and Hong (2006).
6In USFS auctions, the reserve price is typically non-binding and the number of potential bidders is
observable. See Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), Haile (2001) and Haile and Tamer (2003).
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of common values when some bidders have information about rivals’ bids, and applied it
to Canadian Treasury Bill auctions.7 Their approach is tailored to the environment of
Canadian Treasury Bill auctions and is also entirely different from ours.
Our paper also makes a few important econometric contributions by extending the Hill
(1975) tail index estimator κ̂ to imbalanced panels where bids are nonlinearly dependent
within auctions of random size. There are only a few applications of tail index estimation
for panel data: see, for example, Mikosch and de Vreis (2006) and Jongen, Verschoor,
Wolff, and Zwinkels (2006). By exploiting theory developed in Hsing (1991), Hill (2009),
and Hill (2010), the estimator κ̂ is shown to be asymptotically normal where the stochastic
nature of bid counts is irrelevant. In particular, κ̂ has the same asymptotic distribution
as though bids were independent. Although this can simplify inference asymptotically, we
show by the way of Monte Carlo simulations that for sample sizes that are realistic for
auction applications, Hill (2010)’s asymptotic kernel variance estimator provides a better
approximation of the small sample dispersion in κ̂. We recommend using the kernel
variance estimator.
We implement our test on a British Columbia Timber Sales [BCTS] dataset that
contains all auctions conducted from January 14, 2004 to December 14, 2006. Timber
auctions have attracted significant attention in the literature, while most of which focus
on US data. The question of which model, PV or CV, is more appropriate for timber
auctions has not been fully resolved.8 Baldwin (1995) and Athey and Levin (2001) argue
for the presence of common values, while Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997), Haile
(2001), and Haile and Tamer (2003) adopted a PV paradigm.9 Our test rejects private
values for BCTS in favor of common values.
7In Canadian Treasury bill auctions, bidders naturally fall into two groups — dealers and customers,
and the former have an informational advantage over the latter.
8When we say CV, we mean a general model with interdependent values, not necessarily pure common
values.
9We follow Milgrom and Weber (1982) and assume a standard affiliated model of a first-price auction.
Some papers that have studied bidding in US timber auctions focused on the aspects specific to that
market. Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard (1997) have shown that collusion was a common element in these
data. Collusion implies that bids will be close to the reserve. To the extent that there was collusion,
the test results based on a competitive model would have little meaning. Athey and Levin (2001) show
that bids are multi-dimensional and this gives rise to “bid skewing”. Haile (2001) argues that resale was
important which changes the nature of the auction game. We abstract from these possibilities.
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2 The Model and Testable Restrictions
The model is the canonical symmetric model first introduced in Wilson (1977). There are
N ≥ 2 potential bidders who consider bidding at a sealed-bid, first-price auction. The
rules of the auction specify a minimum bid, or reserve price, r. The object is assumed
to have value Ui to logger i, and this value may not be fully known beforehand. Prior
to the auction, bidders obtain information concerning the object summarized by a scalar
signal Si. Bidders may have common as well as private components in their valuations.
The common component is V . The valuation of the bidder is Ui = u(V, Si), where u is a
nonnegative, continuous and nondecreasing function.10 As in Milgrom and Weber (1982),
we assume that the vector (V, S1, ..., SN ) is drawn from some joint distribution F having
density f .
The model is symmetric: the function u is the same for all bidders, and the distribution
F is symmetric in bidders’ signals. We maintain the following assumptions that will allow
us to establish the exact rate of decay of the CDF of bids near the reserve price.
Assumption 1 (Symmetry and Affiliation) The density f is symmetric in the sig-
nals (S1, ..., SN ) and satisfies the affiliation property.11
Assumption 2 (Rectangular Support) The support of F is [v, v̄] × [s, s̄]N , where v <
v̄, s < s̄.
Assumption 3 (Smoothness) The function F is smooth, i.e. has continuous partial
derivatives of all orders: F ∈ C∞([v, v̄] × [s, s̄]N ) . The functions u (v, s) is likewise
smooth, and u ∈ C∞ ([v, v̄] × [s, s̄]).12
Our tail-index results require the following assumption on f , the density of F .
10Milgrom and Weber (1982) allow more generally Ui = u(V, Si, {Sj}j ￿=i), i.e. allow the valuation of a
given bidder to depend on rivals’ signals directly, not only through the common component V . Nothing
would change if we adopted this more general specification. We decided to consider a simpler specification
because it is easy to interpret empirically in our application.
11Recall affiliation implies f (min {x, y}) f (max {x, y}) ≥ f (x) f (y), where min and max are understood
component-wise here. See Milgrom and Weber (1982).
12The infinite differentiability assumption is not required for the derivation of the tail index, but greatly
facilitates the derivation of the rate of decay in Proposition 1 by allowing us to invoke the powerful Morse
Lemma, a tool from differential topology.
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Assumption 4 (Positive Density) The density f is positive on the support [v, v̄] ×
[s, s̄]N .
If u (V, Si) does not depend on V , we have a PV model (an affiliated private values
model, or APV, if the signals are strictly affiliated). Otherwise, we have a CV model. Let
Yi = maxj ￿=i Sj . Milgrom and Weber (1982) have shown that in a symmetric equilibrium,
the bidding strategy B (s) satisfies the differential equation
[v (s) − B (s)] fY1|S1 (s|s) − B
￿ (s) FY1|S1 (s|s) = 0, (1)
where
v (s) ≡ E [Ui|Si = s, Yi = s] ,
the value of the object conditional on “just” winning the auction with bid B (s).
Assumption 5 (Smoothness of v) The function v ∈ C∞ ([s, s̄]) is smooth, and its
derivative is positive: v￿ (s) > 0 for all s ∈ [s, s̄].
This differential equation has a unique solution subject to the boundary condition
B (s∗) = r. Only the bidders with signals Si ≥ s∗ can win the auction. We assume that
bidders having Si < s∗ do not bid. In general the screening level s∗ ∈ [s, s̄], but we assume
that the reserve price is binding: s∗ ∈ (s, s̄). In a symmetric equilibrium, a bidder with
signal Si = s∗ can only win if his potential rivals all draw signals below the screening level,
Sj ≤ s∗. His value conditional on winning is w (s∗), where
w (s) ≡ E [Ui|Si = s, Yi < s] .
By definition, this bidder is a marginal bidder; i.e., is indifferent between entering or
not entering, and makes zero expected profit. The marginal bidder bids r, and the zero
expected profit condition together with the fact that the reserve price is binding implies
that s∗ is determined implicitly from the equation
w (s∗) = r.
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As was first noted in Hendricks, Pinkse and Porter (2003) in their study of wildcat
sales in Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) auctions, there is a difference in bidders’ behavior
around the reserve price under private and common values. Under PV, there is no scope
for the winner’s curse. Therefore,
r = w (s∗) = v (s∗) ,
which implies B￿ (s∗) = 0. Under CV, on the other hand,
r = w (s∗) < v (s∗) ,
and the slope is positive, B￿ (s∗) > 0.
The difference in the slope B￿ (s∗) under PV and CV leads to a difference in the
curvature of the distribution of bids around b = r. Our testing approach is based on a
measure of this curvature, formally captured in the notion of the tail index. It is convenient




Let G∗ (b) be the equilibrium distribution of the normalized bids,
G∗ (b) ≡ Pr [B∗ (Si) ≤ b|Si ≥ s∗] .
The lower bound of the support of G∗ is 0.
Our main result shows the bid distribution tail near the reserve price is governed by
a power law with constant scale, hence it is Paretian. Recall the definition of Paretian
tail decay and the associated tail index (cf. Hall (1982), Embrechts, Kluppleberg, and
Mikosch (1997)).
Definition 1 The (lower) probability tail G∗ (b) exhibits Paretian tail decay with tail index
κ > 0 and scale c > 0 if
G∗ (b) = c · bκ · (1 + o (1)) as b ↓ 0. (3)
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In the proposition below we show the lower normalized bid tail is Paretian, we derive
the tail indexes of G∗(b) under CV and PV, and even stronger we characterize the decay
scale of G∗ (b) as b ↓ 0.
Proposition 1 Under the Assumptions 1 - 5 we have
G∗ (b) = c · bκ · (1 + O (bκ)) (4)
as b ↓ 0 for some c > 0, where κ = 1 under CV and κ = 1/2 under PV.
Proof. We have assumed that the bidders who draw signals below s∗, do not bid.
This implies that the bidding strategy B∗ (s) is only defined on [s∗, s̄]. Our proof will
rely on the Inverse Function Theorem and the Morse Lemma.13 In order to apply these
mathematical results, we need to work on an open domain around s = s∗. Therefore,
we need to smoothly extend B∗ as a function to such an open domain, even though it
does not have an economic meaning for s < s∗. We first show that such an extension is
possible.
Re-arrange the differential equation (1) as
B∗￿ (s) =
[v (s) − rB∗ (s) − r] fY1|S1 (s|s)
rFY1|S1 (s|s)
= Φ [s, B (s)] . (5)
Assumptions 3 and 4 imply the smoothness of fY1|S1 (y|s) on (s, s̄)
2. This in turn implies
that Φ (s, b) is also smooth in s on (s, s̄), and therefore is Lipschitz. Theorem 2.3 in
Mattheij and Molenaar (2002) then implies that, as the solution to the differential equation
(5) the function B∗ (s) can be smoothly extended to an open domain Dε ≡ (s∗ −ε, s∗ +ε),
where ε > 0 is sufficiently small. Assumption 3 implies that the function FSi|Si≥s∗ (s|s) can
also be smoothly extended to Dε. In this proof, we consider both B∗ (s) and FSi|Si≥s∗ (s|s)
smoothly extended to Dε.
Under CV, since B∗￿ (s∗) > 0, the Inverse Function Theorem implies that for a small
13For the statement of the Morse Lemma, see e.g. Guillemin and Pollack (1974), p. 42.
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enough ε > 0, B∗ is a diffeomorphism on Dε, so that the inverse bidding strategy B∗−1
is also smooth (on B∗ (Dε)).14 Then FSi|Si≥s∗ ◦ B∗−1 is smooth on Dε as a composition
of two smooth functions. In particular, it is twice continuously differentiable. Therefore,
since B∗ is a strictly increasing function on its domain, P





= cb (1 + O (b))
as b ↓ 0, where c > 0. This proves the tail index representation with κ = 1 under CV.
Under PV, B∗ has a critical point as s = s∗, B∗￿ (s∗) = 0, and the Inverse Function
Theorem does not apply. However, the critical point is non-degenerate. Indeed, re-writing
the differentiating equation (1) in terms of B∗ and differentiating with respect to s at
s = s∗ gives
￿
v￿ (s∗) − rB∗￿ (s∗)
￿
fY1|S1 (s




fY1|S1 (s∗|s∗) v￿ (s∗)
rFY1|S1 (s∗|s∗)
> 0.
The (one-dimensional) Morse Lemma states that if a smooth function f : D → R,
defined on an open subset D ⊂ R, has a non-degenerate critical point a ∈ D, then there
exists an open neighborhood D0 ⊂ D of a, and a diffeomorphism y : D0 → R such
that ∀x ∈ D0, f (x) = f (a) + f ￿￿ (a) y (x)2. Since f ￿￿ (a) > 0, y (x) must be equal to
￿
f (x) − f (a) if x ≥ a and −
￿
f (x) − f (a) if x < a.15







2 , s ≥ s∗
−B∗ (s)
1
2 , s < s∗
, (7)
14A smooth map f : D → Y ⊂ R defined on some interval D ⊂ R is called a diffeomorphism if it is one
to one and onto, and the inverse map f−1 is smooth; see Guillemin and Pollack (1974), page 3.
15The only other possibility would be to have y (x) =
￿
f (x) − f (a) for all x ∈ D0, but this mapping
is not a diffeomorphism because it does not have an inverse in an open neighborhood of x = a
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is a diffeomorphism on Dε, and therefore has a smooth inverse β−1. Since
















and FSi|Si≥s∗ ◦ β−1 is smooth as a composition of two smooth functions, we conclude that
under PV,
P [B∗ (Si) ≤ b|Si ≥ s∗] = cb
1
2 (1 + O(b
1
2 )),
as b ↓ 0 for some c > 0. Q.E.D.
Remark 1 The result in Proposition 1 relies only on fY1|S1 (s∗|s∗) > 0, so our Assumption
4 can be relaxed. This latter assumption is, however, indispensable. Otherwise the tail
indexes under CV and PV would depend on the rate of convergence of fY1|S1 (s|s) to 0 as
s ↓ s∗. In particular, if fY1|S1 (s|s) ￿ (s − s∗)ι for ι = 1, 2, . . ., then it can be shown that
κ = 1/(1 + ι) under CV, and κ = 1/(2 + ι) under PV.
Remark 2 The second order term O (bκ) in (4) is non-trivial since we have not shown
bids near the reserve price are governed by an exact Pareto law G∗ (b) = c · bκ. We have
shown, however, that the tail exhibits power-law decay G∗ (b) = bκL(b) for some L(b) → c
as b ↓ 0. This in turn has a sharp impact on the precise degree of small sample bias
in the Hill (1975) estimator of κ. The bias is a function of the number of bids used
to compute the estimator, and therefore bounds how many tail observations can be used
to ensure asymptotic unbiasedness. See Section (3.2) for details, and see Haeusler and
Teugels (1985), Goldie and Smith (1987), Hsing (1991) and Hill (2010).
2.1 Robustness to Bidder Asymmetries
Our derivation of the tail index in the preceding section is based on Milgrom and Weber
(1982)’s classic model. Although this model has been widely used in both theoretical
and empirical work, it is not without limitations. The most important restriction is the
assumption that bidders are ex ante symmetric, which limits the scope of application. In
this section, we explore robustness of our tail-index results to bidder asymmetries.
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Private Values
Most of the papers that have incorporated bidder asymmetries, have done so in a model
that allows two bidder groups. Such groups arise naturally in many applications where
there are institutional differences among bidders. For example, in US timber sales, the
most important bidders can be classified as either mills or loggers, who are likely to have
systematic cost differences. See, e.g., Campo, Perrigne, and Vuong (2003) and Athey,
Levin, and Seira (2011). Also, Flambard and Perrigne (2006) consider a model where the
group classification arises as a result of geographic factors. They look at auctions of snow-
removal contracts on the island of Montreal, and explain why the firms on the island may
have substantial cost advantages vis-a-viz firms located outside. Capturing the specifics
of snow removal on the island of Montreal, they explicitly consider two groups of bidders:
strong (those located on the island proper), and weak (those located outside the island).
Within the IPV framework, a relatively complete theoretical characterization of equi-
librium is available: see e.g. Maskin and Riley (2000), Lebrun (1999) and Bajari (2001).16
Another recent paper that also restricts asymmetries to two bidder groups is Athey, Levin,
and Seira (2011). The groups they consider are mills and loggers, who are likely to have
systematic cost differences.
We consider an asymmetric IPV model model with two bidder groups, 1 and 2. Bidders
in each group j ∈ {1, 2} are symmetric, and draw their valuations independently from
distributions Fj , with common support [v, v̄] and with continuously differentiable densities
fj bounded away from 0 on the support. The number of potential bidders in each group
is denoted as Nj , and we assume that each group contains at least two bidders. This
assumption is made to rule out pooling at the reserve; see the discussion at the end of this
section.
Assumption 6 We have Nj ≥ 2, j ∈ {1, 2}.
As before, we assume that there is a binding reserve price r ∈ (v, v̄).17 Let Bj :
16Shneyerov and Wong (2011) consider a model with finitely many groups of bidders and show non-
parametric identification of model primitives even when the number of potential bidders in each group is
unobservable.
17Our assumption that the support [v, v̄] is the same for weak and strong bidders implies that the reserve
price is binding for both groups.
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[r, ∞) → R+ be the bidding strategy of any bidder from group j. Lebrun (1999) and
Maskin and Riley (2000) show that Bj is a continuous, increasing function for each j ∈
{1, 2}. Let αj ≡ B−1j be the corresponding inverse bidding strategy for bidders in group j,
satisfying Bj(v̄) = b̄ for some b̄ > 0. Similar to the previous definition, let the (observable)
distribution of bids for group j be denoted as
Gj(b) ≡
Fj [αj(b)] − Fj(r)
1 − Fj(r)
(b ≥ r). (9)
Then the distribution of normalized bids is G∗
j
(b∗) = Gj(r(1 + b∗)).
Our tail index derivations in this section rely on the differential equations for the
inverse bidding strategies. In the IPV case, Theorem 1 of Lebrun (1999) implies that
there is a unique Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, with differentiable inverse bidding strategies
αj that satisfy the following system of differential equations:
α￿1(b) =
F1 [α1 (b)]


















where we denoted N ≡ N1+N2. Theorem 1 of Lebrun (1999) and the discussion afterward
implies that α1(r) = α2(r) = r. These boundary conditions lead to a singularity at the
reserve price: the (right) derivatives α￿
j
(b) are undefined at b = r. The proposition below
uses this first-order characterization to resolve this singularity, showing that limb↓r α￿j(b) =
+∞, and, further, that the tail index is equal to 1/2 for both groups. This implies
that, within the IPV framework, the tail-index of the symmetric IPV model is robust to
asymmetries.
Proposition 2 We have κj = 1/2, j ∈ {1, 2}.
Common Values
We now present a model that nests the general asymmetric IPV model above, but allows
for interdependent values. Specifically, we obtain tail indexes for a special case of this
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model, the so-called independent signal model, that has been studied by e.g. Lizzeri and
Persico (2000), Branco (1996) and Bulow and Klemperer (1996).
As before, we assume that there are two bidder groups, 1 and 2. Bidder i from
group j ∈ {1, 2} has a signal Si,j . We assume that the signals are drawn independently,
respectively from from the cumulative distributions F1 for group j = 1 and F2 for group
j = 2. Both distributions are assumed to satisfy the same properties as in the general
IPV model considered above. We restrict attention to an additive model: the value Ui,j
of the object to bidder i from group j ∈ {1, 2} now may also depend on the sum of the
signals of other bidders:





























The model nests the general IPV model considered above by setting ω1 = ω2 = 0.
From now on, we assume that a common value component is present for both groups.
Assumption 7 (Common Values) We have ωj > 0 for j ∈ {1, 2}.
We also continue to make Assumption 6. We consider an equilibrium in which only
bidders with signals above the cutoffs s∗
j
∈ (v, v̄) submit a bid, and employ increasing










with the cutoffs s∗
j
found by equating the value of
the object, conditional on all rivals staying out, to the reserve price:
E[Ui,1|Si,1 = s∗1, max
k ￿=i
Sk,1 ≤ s∗1, max
k
Sk,2 ≤ s∗2] = r,
E[Ui,2|Si,2 = s∗2, max
k ￿=i
Sk,2 ≤ s∗2, max
k
Sk,1 ≤ s∗1] = r.
The existence of such an equilibrium is implied by Theorem 2.1 of Reny and Zamir
(2004).18
As before, let αj denote the inverse bidding strategy of a bidder from group j ∈ {1, 2}.
Let α∗
j
≡ αj (r) = s∗j . Using (12) and the monotonicity of αj , this condition can be
18Even though Reny and Zamir (2004) only show existence in non-decreasing strategies, in our two-group
setting with Nj ≥ 2, the strategies must be increasing. Otherwise, a bidder who is tied with a bidder from
the same group with a positive probability will have an incentive to bid higher.
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equivalently stated for each group as
w1 (α∗1, α∗2) ≡ α∗1 + ω1 (N1 − 1) h1 (α∗1) + ω2N2h2 (α∗2) = r, (13)
w2 (α∗1, α∗2) ≡ α∗2 + ω2 (N2 − 1) h2 (α∗2) + ω1N1h1 (α∗1) = r, (14)
where we denoted







In order to derive the tail index using the same methods as in the proof of Proposition 2,
we need the inverse bidding strategies be differentiable in some neighborhood of r. While
this property is not implied by Theorem 2.1 of Reny and Zamir (2004), we proceed under
this assumption.19
Assumption 8 (Differentiable Inverse Strategies) There exists η > 0 such that the
inverse bidding strategies αj(b) are differentiable on (r, r + η).
We now derive a system of differential equations for the inverse strategies α1(b) and
α2(b). Consider a bidder from group 1 with a signal realization s1 who bids b. Assuming all
other bidders follow their prescribed equilibrium strategies, this bidder’s expected profit
is
Π1(s1, b) = {s1 + ω1(N1 − 1)h1(α1(b)) + ω1N2h2(α2(b))} × F N1−11 (α1(b))F
N2
2 (α2(b))
In parallel, a bidder from group 2 with signal realization s2 who bids b has expected profit
Π2(s2, b) = {s2 + ω1N1h1(α1(b)) + ω1(N2 − 1)h2(α2(b))} × F N11 (α1(b))F
N2−1
2 (α2(b))
Tedious, but straightforward algebra shows that the first-order equilibrium conditions
∂Π1(α1(b), b)
∂b
= 0, ∂Π2(α2(b), b)
∂b
= 0
19Suffice it to say here that we did not encounter any problems with this in the examples we numerically
solved in order to perform Monte-Carlo simulations reported in Section 4.
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yield a system of differential equations for the inverse bidding strategies20
α￿1 (b) =
F1 [α1 (b)]
(N − 1) f1 [α1 (b)]
￿
N2
v2 [α1 (b) , α2 (b)] − b
− N2 − 1





(N − 1) f2 [α2 (b)]
￿
N1
v1 [α1 (b) , α2 (b)] − b
− N1 − 1
v2 [α1 (b) , α2 (b)] − b
￿
, (16)
where b ∈ (r, r + η) and
vj (α1, α2) ≡ wj (α1, α2) + ωj [αj − hj (αj)] , j ∈ {1, 2}.
This system is subject to the boundary conditions given by (13) and (14). Since Assump-
tion 7 implies hj (s) < s for j ∈ {1, 2}, we have
vj [α1 (r) , α2 (r)] > r, j ∈ {1, 2}. (17)
In contrast to the system of equations (10) and (11) for the inverse bidding strategies in
the IPV case, here there is no singularity at the reserve: the inverse bidding strategies
have non-negative (right) derivatives at b = r. Moreover, as the proof of the proposition
below shows, α￿
j
(r) > 0 for at least one j ∈ {0, 1}. This leads to the following tail-index
result. In an (N1, N2) auction, the ex ante probability that a randomly chosen bidder is
from group j is Nj/N . The pooled distribution of (normalized) bids then defined as






The proposition below shows that for G∗ (b), the tail index κ = 1.
Proposition 3 We have κ = 1 for the pooled distribution of normalized bids G∗ (b).
Pooling at the reserve. Our Assumption 6 guarantees that there is no pooling (mass
point) at the reserve. Otherwise, each bidder would be tied at the reserve with a positive
probability. An epsilon deviation to bidding higher will lead to a dramatic increase in
20These calculations are available from the authors on request. See Lizzeri and Persico (2000)) for similar
derivations in the two-bidder case, and Lebrun (1999) for the IPV case.
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his probability of winning, while his value conditional on winning will be at least weakly
higher.
In practice, Assumption 6 may not be very restrictive, at least in applications where
there is no a priori rationale for restricting the number of bidders in one of the groups to
one. Even when the numbers of potential bidders are unobservable, we can condition on
the number of actual bidders in each group being greater or equal than 2.21 Our discussion
in Section 3.1 implies that such conditioning will preserve the tail index.
Without Assumption 6, there may be pooling at the reserve. In fact, such pooling
has been found in several interesting models. Hendricks and Porter (1988) study a model
with one perfectly informed bidder (“neighbor”), and a number of uninformed bidders
(“non-neighbors”). They show that, while the distribution of the non-neighbor bids is
right-continuous at the reserve, the distribution of neighbor bids has a mass point at the
reserve.
Under private values, Haile (2000) shows that pooling at the reserve must arise in
English auctions with two bidders and resale. In the asymmetric IPV model considered
above, Theorem 1 in Lebrun (1999) allows for a possibility of αj(r) > r, i.e. pooling (a
mass point) at the reserve, which then implies that equilibrium inverse bidding strategies
αj must satisfy the boundary condition αj(r) = r. If one of the groups is comprised of a
single bidder, the aforementioned theorem allows for a possibility of αj(r) > r, i.e. pooling
(a mass point) at the reserve.
The tail index is not even uniquely defined in the mass point case. Our view is that
the models that involve pooling at the reserve are tailored to the specific applications,
e.g. drainage tract or re-sale. In such applications, the researcher may not even need a
test of common values, since the relevant environment is determined by the institutional
features. Be as it may, in Appendix B we show that the tail index of this distribution is
still equal to 1 for the distribution of the bids conditional on b > r, i.e. upon elimination
of the bids at the reserve.
21See also Shneyerov and Wong (2011), who make a related point in their identification results.
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3 Estimation and Testing Framework
We consider heterogeneous auctions, each characterized by a reserve price r, characteristics
x as well as the number of potential bidders N . The environment (PV or CV) is fixed
across auctions. The vector (r, x, N) is assumed to have distribution H with support




, where X ⊂ Rd is compact, and 2 ≤ N < N̄ < ∞.
The valuations of the bidders now take the form u (v, s, r, x, N), and the information in
the auction is characterized by the conditional density f (v, s1, . . . , sN |r, x, N). We make
further regularity assumptions on the primitives that mirror Assumptions 1 - 5 in the
preceding section.
Assumption 9 For any
(r, x, N) ∈ [r, r̄] × X × {N, . . . N̄} :
(i) the density f (v, s1, ..., sN |r, x, N) is symmetric in the signals (s1, ..., sN ) and satisfies
the affiliation property; (ii) the support of F (·|r, x, N) is [v, v̄] × [s, s̄]N ; (iii) the distribu-
tion function F (·|r, x, N) ∈ C∞([v, v̄] × [s, s̄]N ); (iv) the valuation function u (·, r, x, N) is
smooth in its first two arguments, u (·, r, x, N) ∈ C∞ ([v, v̄] × [s, s̄]); (v) the value condi-
tional on “just” winning is increasing on its domain [s, s̄], and also smooth
v (·, r, x, N) ≡ E [u (V, Si, r, x, N) |Si = ·, Yi = ·, r, x, N ] ∈ C∞ ([s, s̄]) , v￿ (·, r, x, N) > 0;
(vi) the density f (·|r, x, N) is positive on [v, v̄] × [s, s̄]N .
The differential equation that characterizes the bidding strategy B (·|r, x, N) now takes
the form
[v (s, r, x, N) − B (s, r, x, N)] fY1|S1,r,x,N (s|s, r, x, N)
−∂B (s, r, x, N)
∂s
FY1|S1,r,x,N (s|s, r, x, N) = 0 (18)
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subject to the boundary condition
B (s∗ (r, x, N) , r, x, N) = r.
In addition, we assume that the reserve price is binding for all auctions.
Assumption 10 (Binding Reserve Price) For any (r, x, N) ∈ [r, r̄] × X × {N, . . . N̄},
the screening function satisfies s∗ (r, x, N) ∈ (s, s̄).
3.1 Data Generating Process (DGP)
We assume a sample of L auctions is available, and any information specific to an auc-
tion is index by l = 1, .., L. Thus, each auction is characterized by a reserve price rl,
characteristics xl and the number of potential bidders Nl, where 2 ≤ Nl ≤ N . Also, let
nl ∈ {0, 1, ..., Nl} denote the actual number of bidders, which we discuss below. The data
generating process is summarized as follows.
1. Assumption 9 and 10 apply to each auction l = 1, ..., L.
2. The vectors (rl, xl, Nl) are drawn independently from distribution H.
3. Conditional on (rl, xl, Nl) (l = 1, ..., L), the signals Si,l of potential bidders i =
1, ..., Nl and the common value components Vl are drawn independently across l
from the distribution F (·|r, x, N).
4. Only the bidders whose signals exceed the screening level, Si,l ≥ s∗(rl, xl, Nl), submit
bids. The bids of active bidders are determined according to
bi,l = B (Si,l, rl, xl, Nl) , (i = 1, ..., nl) ,
where the bidding strategy B is found as the solution to (18).
Remark 3 Model symmetry ensures the DGP is stationary, and given a bid is made
(i.e. nl ≥ 1) the joint distribution of any q-tuple of bids {bi1,l, ..., biq ,l}, 1 ≤ q ≤ nl,
is exchangeable. This follows since the strategy B(·) does not depends on the bidder i
19
or auction l, and a bid bi.l depends only on the pre-auction signal Si,l and information
common to all bidders {rl, xl, Nl}, hence the order of bids in an active auction (nl ≥ 1) is
irrelevant.
Denote the jth potential bidder’s decision to submit a bid as




1, Sj,l ≥ s∗ (rl, xl, Nl)
0, otherwise





Ij,l (Sj,l, rl, xl, Nl) and n := max1≤l≤L {nl} .
We index active bidders as i = 1, ..., nl for auctions with at least one bidder nl ≥ 1, where





The data available to the econometrician consists of an (independent and identically
distributed across l) sample of observations
￿




Motivated by practical considerations, we assume that only auctions with a bidder nl ≥1
are observable.





This normalization has the advantage that the lower bound of the support of b∗
i,l
is 0
regardless of the covariates, and the tail behavior can be characterized around b = 0. Our
Assumption 9 allows us to invoke the same arguments as in Proposition 1 to obtain the
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following power-law decay property conditional on auction information: as b ↓ 0,
P
￿
b∗i,l ≤ b|rl, xl, Nl, Ii,l = 1
￿
= C (rl, xl, Nl, Ii,l = 1) · bκ · (1 + O (bκ)) (20)
where C (rl, xl, Nl, Ii,l = 1) > 0 a.s. Thus, given an auction has at least one bidder (i.e.
some Ii,l = 1 hence nl ≥ 1), and given observable auction characteristics xl, normalized
bids exhibit the same first and second order tail decay rates bκ and O (bκ) as shown in
Proposition 1. If we denote by σ(w) the σ-field generated by a random vector w, then
since
σ (rl, xl, nl, Ii,l = 1) ⊆ σ (rl, xl, Nl, Ii,l = 1) ,
the law of iterated expectations applied to (20) implies that the distribution of b∗
i,l
condi-
tional on any vector of observable variables zl governed by our DGP with
σ (zl) ⊆ σ (rl, xl, nl)
also exhibits power-law decay with the same tail index κ:
G∗ (b|zl) ≡ P
￿
b∗i,l ≤ b|zl, Ii,l = 1
￿
= c(zl) · bκ · (1 + O (bκ)) as b ↓ 0, (21)
where c(zl) := E[C(rl, xl, Nl)|zl, Ii,l = 1] > 0 a.s. on the support of zl.
Of particular importance to us will be the cases of conditioning on an auction size
zl = nl, or all observable auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}, or a constant zl = c since
the latter generates the trivial sigma-field corresponding to the unconditional distribution
G∗(b|c) = G∗ (b). The latter case leads to the following important corollary that shows
the invariance of the tail index with respect to auction heterogeneity. This is key to our
reduced form method since we do not use any information in our test other than bids.
Corollary 1 Under Assumption 9, the unconditional power-law (4) for G∗ (b) continues
to hold even under auction heterogeneity.
Binding reserve price. Our assumption that the reserve price is binding for all auctions,
s∗ (rl, xl, Nl) ∈ (s, s̄), is important for the above derivation, but can be relaxed. For
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example, we could alternatively assume that, because of auction heterogeneity, the reserve
price is binding some of the time.22 That is,
ρ ≡ P [s∗ (rl, xl, Nl) = s] ∈ (0, 1) .
Then the marginal (normalized) bid distribution is a mixture of two distributions,
G∗ (b) = ρG1 (b) + (1 − ρ) G2 (b)
where
G1 (b) ≡ P
￿
b∗i,l ≤ b|nl ≥ 1, s∗ (rl, xl, Nl) = s
￿
and
G2 (b) ≡ P
￿
b∗i,l ≤ b|nl ≥ 1, s∗ (rl, xl, Nl) > s
￿
.
The distribution G1(b) has tail index κ1 = 1 regardless of the environment (PV or CV),
while the distribution G2 (b), as before, has tail index κ2 = κ that depends on the envi-
ronment, i.e. κ = 1/2 under PV and κ = 1 under CV. It is easy to see that the tail index
is preserved under CV. Under PV,















(1 − ρ) c2
b
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where c1, c2 > 0. In practice, we would really just need the reserve price to be binding
often enough to get the statistical power for our tests.
3.2 The Hill Estimator
In view of Corollary 1 we only require an unconditional estimator of the tail index. The
Hill (1975) estimator of the tail index is based on the following fact (see Hsing (1991) and
22Allowing for a nonbinding reserve, the screening level s∗ is defined as in Milgrom and Weber (1982),
equation (10) on p.1111: s∗ = inf{s ∈ [s, s̄] : w(s) ≥ r}. With this definition, the reserve price is
nonbinding if and only if s∗ = s.
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Embrechts, Kluppleberg, and Mikosch (1997)):
κ−1 = E
￿
log q − log b∗i,l| log b∗i,l ≤ log q
￿
+ O (qκ) as q ↓ 0. (22)
Thus, the inverse of the tail index κ−1 is the mean distance of the log-normalized bid
log b∗
i,l
below some low threshold log q, as q ↓ 0.
Equation (22) suggests a natural way of estimating κ−1 by a sample analog, with an
appropriately chosen sequence of threshold bids q ↓ 0 as the sample size goes to infinity.












let b∗(j) be the jth sample order statistic of b∗t , b∗(1) ≤ b∗(2) ≤ · · · ≤ b∗(n), and let mn be
the number of bids near the reserve price in consideration, a function of n. Since auction
sizes {nl}Ll=1 are random variables, the sample size n =
￿
l
nl and therefore the number
of bids near the reserve price mn are also random. See Section 3.6 for a discussion on the
selection of mn in practice.
Assume {mn} = {mn}n≥1 is an intermediate order sequence: 1 ≤ mn < n, mn a.s.→
∞, and mn/n a.s.→ 0 as L → ∞; cf. Leadbetter, Lindgren, and Rootzen (1983). Then
the sequence of threshold bids is chosen as b∗(mn+1) as in Hall (1982), and the Hill (1975)






















Other estimators exist but none have been shown to be as robust to unknown forms of
dependence and heterogeneity. See the literature reviews in Hsing (1991) and Hill (2009,
2010, 2011).
In the case of i.i.d. data with power-law tail decay that satisfies a second order power
expansion, and deterministic sample size n, Hall (1982) shows κ̂−1mn is consistent for κ−1
and asymptotically normal with the asymptotic variance equal to κ−2. However, our
23In the following we write (z)+ to denote max{z, 0}.
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setting is not i.i.d. because bids may be correlated within an auction. Even though the
literature contains several results for the non i.i.d. case, these results are for time-series
data, and they do not transfer immediately to our setting of an unbalanced panel with
stochastic auction sizes (e.g. Resnick and Starica (1998), Hsing (1991), Hill (2010)).
As a first step toward obtaining the limit distribution of κ̂−1mn we need to characterize
the intermediate order statistic b∗(mn+1) in terms of distribution tail properties. Since
b∗(mn+1) is measurable with respect to the sigma-field generated by all bids and auction
sizes, it is convenient to denote the sigma-field induced by observable auction sizes nl
represented by a sample realization of bids {b∗t }nt=1 = {b∗i,l : 1 ≤ i ≤ nl}Ll=1:
￿L := σ
￿
{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1
￿
.
We now use ￿L to condition on the event of observable auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1},
a convenient intermediary step toward unconditional asymptotics. By (20) we may write
P (b∗t < b|￿L), the probability an arbitrary bid b∗t is below a threshold b, given the bid
exists in some active auction in a sample of active auctions {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}. Thus,
another contribution of Proposition 1 and therefore the arguments leading to (20) and
(21), is they ensure P (b∗t < b|￿L) is well defined, ￿L-measurable, and exhibits power-law
decay with the same index κ > 0,
G∗ (b|￿L) := P (b∗t < b|￿L) = cL × bκ (1 + O(bκ)) , κ > 0, as b ↓ 0, (24)
where cL is ￿L-measurable and positive with probability one.







G∗ (qn|￿L) − 1
￿￿￿￿ > ε|￿L
￿
= 0 ∀ε > 0 on ￿L − a.e.,




p→ 1 on ￿L − a.e., (25)
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and a.e. denotes almost everywhere. Note that “on ￿L − a.e.” implies convergence is in
probability, almost surely with respect to an asymptotic draw of observed auction sizes
{{nl}∞l=1 : nl ≥ 1}.24 By (24) we can always choose qn = (mn/n)1/κc
−1/κ
L
, but any sequence
{qn} that satisfies qn = (mn/n)1/κc−1/κL (1 + op(1)) is also valid.
By construction qn
p→ 0 follows from {mn} being an intermediate order sequence
hence mn/n a.s.→ 0, and since b∗(mn+1) is the sample mn/n
th quantile for a given sequence
of observed auction sizes {{nl}∞l=1 : nl ≥ 1}, it follows b∗(mn+1) estimates qn. Notice the




The Hill (1975) estimator κ̂−1mn for panels of stochastic sample size still approximates
the mean distance of the log-normalized bid log b∗
i,l
below a low threshold, a la (22). See
Appendix A for omitted proofs.







(log qn − log b∗t )+
￿
.
Conditioned on observable auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}, bids b∗i,l exhibit only finite
dependence due to bounded auction sizes and cross-auction independence, so asymptotic
normality follows straightforwardly. Since unconditional asymptotic normality is then
trivial, we dedicate the majority of the following discussion to framing how arguments
developed in Hsing (1991), Hill (2009) and Hill (2010) lead to normality when we condition
on auction sizes.
Define conditionally mean centered bid tail log-exceedances and events
U (L)
mn,t
:= (log (qn/b∗t ))+ − E
￿












, u ≥ 0,
24See Leadbetter et al (1983: Theorem 1.7.13) for classic treatments of intermediate order sequences.
We impose (25) to ensure the stochastic sequences {mn} and {qn} have the same asymptotic relationship
irrespective of the draw of observable auction sizes asymptotically {{nl}∞l=1 : nl ≥ 1}. By dominated
convergence (25) implies unconditional probability convergence limL→∞P (|(n/mn)G∗(qn|￿L) − 1| > ε) →
0 ∀ε > 0. Technically the latter limit also holds on ￿L −a.e. because (n/mn)G∗(qn|￿L) is ￿L-measurable,
and convergence is in probability to the constant 1 for any draw {{nl}∞l=1 : nl ≥ 1}. We simply use
p→
without writing “on ￿L − a.e.” to denote unconditional convergence, e.g. (n/mn)G∗(qn|￿L)
p→ 1, to avoid
confusion with conditional probability convergence (25).
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} or the auc-







The array {T (L)
mn,t
} plays an elegant role in Hill (1975) estimator asymptotics. In the
case of non-random n and for a broad class of second order regularly varying tails that
encompasses (24), κ̂−1mn expands into a sample mean of {T
(L)
mn,t
} (Hsing (1991), Hill (2009,
2010)), and {T (L)
mn,t
} satisfies a Gaussian central limit theorem for a large class of dependent
and heterogeneous processes (Hill (2009, 2010, 2011)). We summarize the argument below.







. Given power law tail decay (24) and finite dependence, as long
as there are sufficiently many bids drawn close to the reserve price asymptotically in the
sense mn a.s.→ ∞ and mn/n2/3 a.s.→ 0, then |Xn − Yn|
p→ 0 by Lemma A.7 in Hill (2009)25,












+ op(1), almost surely with respect to ￿L. (26)























Power law tail decay and finite dependence ensure Corollary 3.3 of Hill (2009) applies to
25See Hsing (1991) for seminal theory contributions along these lines.
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d→ N (0, 1) almost surely with respect to ￿L. (27)
Further, in Section 3.3 and in Appendix A.1 we show conditionally σ2
mn|L
p→ κ−2 almost
surely with respect to ￿L. That is, even under bid dependence the classic asymptotic
result for i.i.d. data holds. See especially Section 3.3 for discussion. In the present setting
the important finding is non-degeneracy: lim infL→∞ σ2mn|L > 0 with probability one with













+ op (1) , (28)
where the op(1) term converges to zero in probability almost surely with respect to ￿L.
By Theorem 3.1 in Billingsley (1999) it therefore follows m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/σmn|L has the






. Now combine (27) and (28)







d→ N (0, 1) almost surely with respect to ￿L. (29)
Limit (29) is an extension of Theorem 3 in Hill (2010) to imbalanced panels with known
sample sizes. Since the limiting standard normal distribution in (29) is the same for any
asymptotic draw {{nl}∞l=1 : nl ≥ 1}, apply Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem to
prove κ̂−1mn is unconditionally asymptotically normal.
Theorem 5 Under the bid DGP, for any σ(∪L≥1￿L)-measurable intermediate order se-
quence {mn}, mn a.s.→ ∞ and mn/n2/3 a.s.→ 0, unconditionally m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/σmn|L
d→
N(0, 1).




− κ−1)2|￿L], the mean-squared-error of κ̂−1mn con-
ditioned on a random draw of auction sizes.26 Although (29) holds with scale σmn|L
26Note that in general v2mn|L is not the conditional variance of κ̂
−1
mn since the Hill (1975) estimator is
biased (e.g. Hall (1982), Embrechts, Kluppleberg, and Mikosch (1997), Segers (2002)).
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and implies convergence to a law with unit variance, this does not suffice to deduce
m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/vmn|L
d→ N(0, 1). This is irrelevant for practical purposes since σ2
mn|L
is easily estimated. See Section 3.3.
Hill (1975)’s estimator is perfectly designed for a distribution with an exact Pareto
tail, e.g. G∗(b|￿L) = cL · bκ ∀b ≤ b and some b > 0, in which case the bias term O(qκ) in
(22) is identically zero. Otherwise, power-law tails with a second order regular variation
property like (24) imply a mean log-exceedance with bias like (22). The bias identically
arises in Hill’s (1975) estimator E[κ̂−1mn ] ￿= κ−1 since κ̂−1mn is nothing more than a sample
conjugate of the expectation in (22). Since the second order term vanishes as b ↓ 0, the
bias can be corrected asymptotically as long as bids used to compute κ−1 are obtained
sufficiently near the reserve price, while maintaining mn a.s.→ ∞ for asymptotic normality.
This translates to setting mn a.s.→ ∞ sufficiently slowly. In order for κ̂−1mn to have zero
asymptotic bias for the power-law class G∗(b|￿L) = cL · bκ(1 + O(bθ)), θ ≥ 0, as b ↓ 0
when n is non-random it is well known mn = o(n2θ/(2θ+κ)) suffices. See Hall (1982) and
Haeusler and Teugels (1985). Since by Proposition 1 we have θ = κ, and n is random by
our DGP, we must have mn/n2/3 a.s.→ 0.
Even though the unconditional Hill estimator of κ is consistent, an estimator obtained
by first conditioning on observable auction characteristics, and then averaging the condi-
tional estimators, could be more efficient. However, the normalization of bids (19) likely
removes the effect of covariates on bids, at least to some extent.27 For example, if we
assume a multiplicative structure Vl = a (xl) Ṽl, Si,l = a (xl) S̃i,l and rl = a (xl) r̃l, where
(Ṽl, S̃i,l, r̃l) and xl are independent, then bi,l = a (xl) b̃i,l, where b̃i,l and xl are also in-
dependent.28 This implies that b∗
i,l
= (bi,l/rl) − 1 and xl are likewise independent, and
conditioning on xl is not necessary. However, even in this specification, the dependence
between b∗
i,l
and nl generally remains, so in principle one could benefit from conditioning
on nl. But our Monte-Carlo simulations have shown that in samples of typical size, even
though the reduction in the variance of the estimator can be substantial, it is potentially
27See Roberts (2008) who proposes a general argument.
28A variant of this specification was also considered in Krasnokutskaya (2011).
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overwhelmed by the small sample bias.29
3.3 Variance Characterization for CV and PV Auctions
As a consequence of Theorem 5 we require an estimate of σ2
mn|L for our test of CV or PV.
The first task is to decompose σ2
mn|L into manageable components. In Appendix A we




















where op(1) reflects convergence to zero in probability as L → ∞. There are three prop-
erties to take note. First,
￿
L
l=1 nl(nl − 1)/
￿
L
l=1 nl ∈ (0, ∞) a.s. as L → ∞ since under
our DGP auction sizes are finite nl ≤ N and infinitely many auctions have more than one
bidder nl > 1. Second, symmetry and exchangeability imply dependence across any two
bidders is the same, so we need only look at bidders 1 and 2. Therefore, third for our DGP
σ2
mn|L asymptotically reduces to the i.i.d. case κ
−2 plus a correction term that captures
total within-auction bid dependence across different bidders.




2) = op(mn/n) hence
from (30) we obtain σ2
mn|L





2) follows from the fact that signal distribu-
tion smoothness Assumption 9(iii) and boundedness from below Assumption 9(vi) imply
the joint bid density is bounded by the marginals, while tail variables (log(qn/b∗t ))+ and
I(b∗t < qne−u) have conditional means of order Op(mn/n).30 Thus, although bids may be
dependent, and dependent near the reserve price in the sense E[T (L)
mn,1,lT
(L)
mn,2,l|￿L] ￿= 0 with
positive probability, dependence is negligible enough relative to the size of the vanishing
bid tail portion mn/n a.s.→ 0 that it does not impact Hill (1975) estimator asymptotics.




mn,2,l|￿L]. We summarize the above conclusion with the following
result.
29The simulations are available on request.
30We thank a referee for pointing out the joint density may be bounded by the marginal product under
our DGP, and suggesting this may lead to the class asymptotic variance κ−2.
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Theorem 6 Under the bid DGP for either CV or PV bidding strategies σ2
mn|L
p→ κ−2.
Therefore m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/κ̂−1mn
d→ N(0, 1).
The outcome that a nonparametric estimator with dependent data has an asymptotic
variance equivalent to the i.i.d. case is certainly not unique to tail index estimation for
auction bids. Hill (2011a), for example, shows m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/κ−1
d→ N(0, 1) for a
stochastic volatility process that is dependent in general, and tail dependent, yet exhibits
tail array uncorrelatedness similar to the present case. In general the issue is well known
in the nonparametric econometrics literature. Consider Rosenblatt (1971) and Robinson
(1983) for classic treatments, and see Section 4 in Ichimura and Todd (2007) for further
details and references.
Nevertheless, while ignoring bid dependence is legitimate under the first order asymp-
totics that justify κ̂−2mn as a variance estimator, Monte Carlo evidence in Hill and Shneyerov
(2010) suggests that taking dependence into account is important in finite samples.31 In
the following subsection we present a consistent non-parametric estimator of σ2
mn|L due to
Hill (2010) that leads to sharp inference in practice.
3.4 Non-Parametric Variance Estimation
By exploiting the construction of qn in (25) and the property E[(ln(qn/b∗t ))+|￿L] =
(mn/n)κ−1 × (1 + op(1)) verified in the proof of Lemma 8 in Appendix A.2, a natural es-
timator of σ2



















t ))+ − (mn/n)κ̂−1mn and Î
(L)
mn,t
= I(b∗t < b∗(mn+1)) − mn/n.
















by exploiting the indicator I(b∗t < b∗(mn+1)), the two ap-
pearances of κ̂−1mn(mn/n) in T̂
(L)
mn,t



















is not guaranteed to be
positive (Newey and West (1987)).
In view of the latter problem, Hill (2010) exploits a now classic nonparametric ap-
31CV bids are positively associated due to affiliation, even when there is no unobserved heterogeneity.
In practice, unobserved heterogeneity is likely to make bids positively associated within the auction even
under PV. See Krasnokutskaya (2011).
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proach for estimating the variance σ2
mn|Lwhen n is non-random. In the present setting
this instantly extends to σ2

















where k denotes a kernel function, k(0) = 1, with bandwidth γn. The kernel k((s − t)/γn)




|s − t| so that σ̂2
mn|L > 0 a.s. for all n ≥ 1, while ostensibly retaining consistency (Newey
and West (1987)). As a bonus, a fully nonparametric approach allows the analyst to have
only a vague idea about cross auction dependence and heterogeneity.
A large class of kernel functions k(z) can be considered in the following arguments,
including Parzen, Tukey-Hanning, and Quadratic-Spectral (cf. Hill (2010)), but by far
the Bartlett kernel k(z) = (1 − |z|)+ is the most popular in the economics literature. See
de Jong and Davidson (2000) for references. Since the construction (log(b∗(mn+1)/b
∗
t ))+




that is gauged by bandwidth γn, some care for choosing γn must be taken.
Further, if we take γn to be a function of n then bandwidth is a random variable.
Theorem 7 Let k(z) = (1 − |z|)+, γn a.s.→ ∞, (n1/2/mn)γn a.s.→ 0, mn/n a.s.→ 0 and mn/n1/2
a.s.→ ∞. Under the bid DGP, σ̂2






Remark 5 The bounds on the fractile mn and bandwidth γn together imply γn/n1/2 a.s.→ 0.
We require sufficiently many tail observations mn/n1/2 a.s.→ ∞ and sufficiently few cross-
products γn/n1/2 a.s.→ 0 to ensure the estimators b∗(mn+1) and κ̂
−1
mn
that occur in every Ûmn,t
do not affect the limit of σ̂2
mn|L. Intuitively, a larger mn for each n implies with increased
probability less error b∗(mn+1)/qn ≈ 1 and κ̂
−1
mn
≈ κ−1, and smaller γn for each n limits
the amassed error over all included Û (L)mn,sÛ
(L)
mn,t
. In many regression contexts the former is
not an option since plug-ins typically have a fixed rate of convergence.32 Here we have the
32Estimation of tail parameters, and population parameters by tail-trimming, may both involve variable
rates of convergence. In both cases selecting a tail fractile sequence {mn} is synonymous with selecting a
rate of convergence. See Hill (2011b) and his references.
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option to manipulate the m1/2n -rate of convergence of b∗(mn+1) and κ̂
−1
mn
simply by choice of
{mn}. In practice mn/n1/2 a.s.→ ∞ and (n1/2/mn)γn a.s.→ 0 are easily satisfied. Consider,
for example, a fractile mn = [λn1/2+δ] for any λ ∈ (0, 1] and δ ∈ (0, 1/2), and a bandwidth
γn = [nδ/ ln(n)].
By Theorem 7 σ̂2
mn|L consistently estimates the Hill (1975) estimator scale σ
2
mn|L,
but by simplicification (31) σ̂2









s,t=1 E[Umn,sUmn,t|￿L] where Umn,t := (log(b∗(mn+1)/b
∗










p→ 1 it is nevertheless true that σ̂2
mn|L directly approximates the small
sample dispersion of κ̂−1mn by estimating v2mn|L. Combined with σ̂
2
mn|L > 0 a.s. for any
sample of bids {b∗
i,l
: 1 ≤ i ≤ nl}Ll=1, these are the most promising properties of σ̂2mn|L.
Since σ̂2
mn|L directly approximates the second moment of m
1/2
n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1), it follows the
ratio m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/σ̂mn|L is close to a law with zero mean and unit variance. Further,
even for moderately sized samples of auction bids m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1) is close to normally
distributed, so the ratio m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/σ̂mn|L is close to a N(0, 1) distribution. This is
fundamentally important for our test since it is based on a t-ratio with critical values taken
from the asymptotic N(0, 1) distribution (see below). By contrast, although m1/2n (κ̂−1mn −
κ−1)/κ̂−1mn is valid by Theorem 6, it leads to non-negligible over-rejection of CV or PV
hypotheses since κ̂−2mn does not well approximate the mean-squared-error of κ̂−1mn . See
Section 4 and see Hill and Shneyerov (2010).
3.5 Consistent Test of PV against CV













mn|L). Let Zθ be the upper
θ-quantile of a standard normal distribution: P (Z > Zθ) = θ where Z is distributed
N(0, 1). An asymptotic test at nominal significance level θ ∈ [0, 1] reduces to rejecting H0
32
: κ = 1/2 in favor of H1 : κ > 1/2 when τmn ≤ −Zθ since by Theorem 5 and Cramér’s
theorem under PV the ratio satisfies τmn
d→ N(0, 1). Conversely, under CV (κ = 1) it
follows |τmn |
p→ ∞ hence τmn promotes a consistent test.33
3.6 Fractile Selection
In the literature the only theory offered for selecting an optimal fractile mn ∈ {1, 2, ..., n−1}
for any finite sample is for i.i.d. data with a non-random sample size n. Examples include
minimizing the unconditional mean-squared-error E[mn(κ̂−1mn − κ−1)2] (e.g. Huisman,
Koedijk, Kool, and Palm (2001)), working with variants of Hill-plots, like plots of κ̂−1[nλ] over
λ (Resnick and Starica (1997)), or measuring the occupation time of κ̂−1mn in a neighborhood
of κ−1 (e.g. Drees, de Haan, and Resnick (2000)).
It is unknown if any of the above methods are appropriate for panels with a random
sample size and finite dependent data since a supporting theory is not available. Consider a
general class of cadlag fractile functions mn(λ), e.g. mn(λ) = [λn/ln(n)] or mn(λ) = [nλ],






mn(λ)|L over Λ, but κ̂
−2
mn(λ) is a poor approximation
of σ2
mn(λ)|L for auction bids in small samples, uniform consistency of σ̂
2
mn(λ)|L is unknown,
and of course Λ must somehow be chosen.34,35
In our simulation study and timber auction application we therefore must resort to
conventional Hill-plots of κ̂−1mn over mn discussed in Embrechts, Kluppleberg, and Mikosch
(1997), Drees, de Haan, and Resnick (2000) and elsewhere. If the data are truly generated
by an exact i.i.d. Pareto law then κ̂−1mn will hover fairly close to κ−1 over a broad range
33By an extension of the Neyman-Pearson Lemma and Theorem 5 our test is Asymptotically Most
Powerful within the class of statistics based on the estimator κ̂−1mn , and obtains an asymptotic power of one
against any arbitrary global deviation from the null (e.g. H0 : κ = 1/2 against H1 : κ ￿= 1/2). Whether a
different class of tests exists and obtains more small sample power than ours is not considered here.
34In the case of non-random sample sizes, Hill (2010) proves for dependent heterogeneous data uni-
form consistency supλ∈Λ |κ̂−1mn(λ) − κ
−1| p→ 0 for a class of cadlag fractiles mn(λ), e.g. mn(λ) =
[λn/ ln(n)], but only proves consistency of σ̂2mn|L. Similarly Hill (2009) derives the Gaussian weak
limit of {m1/2n (κ̂−1mn (λ) − κ
−1) : λ ∈ [0, 1]} on D[0,1] for dependent and heterogeneous data, where
κ̂
−1




([λmn]+1) − log b
∗
t )+. Uniform consistency of σ̂2mn(λ)|L, however, requires a
stochastic equicontinuity condition (e.g. Newey (1991)) that appears in reach but has not been shown.
35In simulations not reported here a fractile m̂n := mn(λ̂n) computed with λ̂n := argminλ∈Λ{κ̂−2mn(λ)}
or argminλ∈Λ{σ̂2mn(λ)|L} does not work well for auction bids. Inference in the form of t-tests based on
m̂
1/2
n (κ̂−1m̂n − κ
−1)/κ̂−1m̂n or m̂
1/2
n (κ̂−1m̂n − κ
−1)/σ̂m̂n|L is not sharp.
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of mn. See the references above for simulation evidence. In a non-i.i.d. setting this does
not hold as a general rule of thumb36, although we find strong evidence it applies to
CV and PV data based on homogeneous or heterogeneous bidders with or without signal
symmetry. In particular, by increasing L in controlled experiments below we are indeed
able to portray an optimal range of mn for CV or PV data, at least for our chosen Monte
Carlo design.
4 A Monte Carlo Study
4.1 Data Generating Processes
We study two types of DGP’s for bids: the first imposes symmetry and allows unobserved
heterogeneity; while the second allows for asymmetry under homogeneity.
In the first experiment we consider a model where bidders may have a common as
well as private value components in their valuations as in Wilson (1977, 1998).37 Suppose
the log of bidder i’s true valuation ui is a sum of a common value component v and an
idiosyncratic component ai: ui = v + ai, where v is normally distributed with mean µv
and variance σ2v , while ai is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2a. Generally,
the bidders do not observe their valuations, but observe signals si that are informative
about the valuations: si = ui + εi, where the "noise" term εi is also mean zero normally
distributed, with variance σ2ε . This model nests naturally a private values environment
within a common values one. If σε = 0, then the environment is PV, and the private
values are correlated to the extent that σv > 0. (If also σv = 0, then the environment is
independent private values, IPV.) But if σε > 0, then the true valuations are unobservable,
and we have a model with a common value component.
Figure 1 shows numerically computed bidding strategies B (s) and bid densities g (b)
for two examples of the above model.38 In the first example (the CV example, on the
36We find in numerous experiments not presented here that if the data exhibit random volatility, or are
governed by a non-finite lag process with short- or long-range dependence, then Hill-plots can be essentially
non-informative.
37See also Hong and Shum (2002) for an application to highway procurement auctions.
38A Mathematica notebook used to compute these examples is available at http://artyom239.
googlepages.com
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left panel), we set σv = σa = σε = 0.3. In the second example (the PV example, on the
right panel) we set σv = σa = 0.3 and σε = 0. In both examples, N = 6, the mean log
valuation µv = log 100 and the reserve price is $80. A barely noticeable, but important
difference between the graphs in the top panel is that under PV the bidding strategy has
zero slope at s = s∗ (the right graph), while it has a positive slope there under CV (the
left graph). This behavior of the bidding strategy translates into a profoundly different
behavior of the density of bids g (b) around the reserve price, illustrating the power of our
Proposition 1 (see the graphs on the lower panel). Under CV, g (b) is continuous around
r. But under PV, the density around the reserve price has a "spike". (The fact that the
slope of B (s) is zero at s = s∗ implies that the density is unbounded.)
In the Monte Carlo simulation for this model, we incorporate unobserved heterogeneity
by assuming that in each auction, µ takes a value in the set {log 80, log 100, log 120}, each
with equal probability.
In the second experiment we consider a variant of the asymmetric model with interde-
pendent values from Section 2. For this model, we employ uniform [0, 1] distributions for
bidder signals, F1 (s) = F2 (s) = s, and fix the number of potential bidders from groups 1
and 2 to N1 = N2 = 2. The reserve price is r = 0.2. The bidders’ valuations are specified
as follows:
u1 = s1 + 0.1 × s2 = 0.1 × (s1 + s2) + 0.9 × s1,
u2 = s2 + 0.2s1 = 0.2 × (s1 + s2) + 0.8 × s2.
This corresponds to relatively small common value components for both groups. The
bidding strategies, which we computed by solving the system numerically, are shown in
Figure 2.
The randomly generated samples of bids are {bi,l : i = 1, ..., nl}Ll=1; and R = 250
samples of L = 250, 500, or 1000 auctions are drawn. As always we use the centered bids
b∗
i,l
= bi,l/r − 1 where r = 80 with symmetric bidders, or r = 0.2 with asymmetric bidders.
We use L = 1000 to gauge the “asymptotic” performance of our test statistic, and L =250
or 500 to gauge small sample performance for the type of sample sizes encountered in
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practice. For each PV and CV sample the Hill estimator κ̂−1mm and corresponding kernel
variance estimator σ̂2
mn|L are computed over the fractile window mn ∈ {5, ..., 200} with a
Bartlett kernel and bandwidth γn = n.225.39 We then use CV and PV test performance
under null and alternative hypotheses to deduce an optimal range of mn. In order to
conserve space we relegate simulation plots with L = 500 or 1000 to Hill and Shneyerov
(2010), and make remarks below where helpful.
In view of the fact that κ̂−2mm as an estimator of the asymptotic variance leads to non-
negligible over rejection of the null hypotheses, we relegate associated simulation results
and comments to Hill and Shneyerov (2010).
4.2 Tail Inference - Symmetric Bids with Unobserved Heterogeneity
Consider the first experiment with symmetric bidders and unobserved heterogeneity. We
plot the average κ̂−1mn and 90% asymptotic confidence bands κ̂−1mn ± 1.64×σ̂mn|L/
√
mn over
the R = 250 simulated samples, along with the simulation average 5% and 95% empirical
quantiles. We also plot t-test rejection frequencies for the test of H0: PV κ = 1/2 against
H1: κ > 1/2, and test of H0: CV κ = 1 against H1: κ < 1, each at the 5% level. See
Figure 3.
Figure 3(a)-3(c) presents results for PV data with L = 250 auctions. The figure
displays κ̂−1mn ± 1.64 × σ̂mn|L/
√
mn and the 5% and 95% quantiles of κ̂−1mn in panel (a);
rejection frequencies over the R = 250 samples in panel (b) are for the one-sided tests of
PV κ = 1/2 based on the t-ratio √mn(κ̂−1mn − 2)/σ̂mn|L; and rejection frequencies for tests
of CV κ = 1 are in panel (c). The Hill estimator uniformly hovers near κ̂−1mn = 2 in panel
(a) where the 90% bands never contain κ−1 = 1, providing strong support for Proposition
1.
The tests of PV κ = 1/2 against κ > 1/2 in Figure 3(b) result in t-ratio rejection
frequencies near 5% for all fractiles mn ≥ 20. Thus, when using asymptotic Gaussian
critical values, the kernel estimator σ̂2
mn|L with Bartlett kernel and bandwidth γn = n
.225
results in a sharp approximation of the 5% nominal test size. If we flip the hypotheses
39The bandwidth must satisfy γn/n1/2 a.s.→ 0 to ensure consistency σ̂2mn|L/v
2
mn|L
p→ 1 by Theorem 7. We
repeatedly find γn = [nδ] for δ ∈ [.2, .25] to be superior across a large variety of data generating processes,
hence we use the mid-point δ = .225. Any δ in the range [.2, .25] leads to qualitatively similar results.
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and test CV κ = 1 against κ < 1 then in panel (c) rejection frequencies are above 90% for
mn ≥ 40 and above 95% for mn ≥ 45.
Now consider Figure 3(d)-3(f) for CV data with L = 250 auctions. The figure displays
κ̂−1mn ± 1.64 × σ̂mn|L/
√
mn and the 5% and 95% quantiles of κ̂−1mn in panel (d); panel
(e) contains rejection frequencies for the one-sided test of CV κ = 1 based on t-ratios
√
mn(κ̂−1mn − 1)/σ̂mn|L; and rejection frequencies for tests of PV κ = 1/2 are in panel (f).
The Hill estimator hovers near κ̂−1mn = 1, where the 90% bands never contain κ−1 = 2,
again supporting Proposition 1.
Tests of CV κ = 1 against κ < 1 result in rejection frequencies roughly monotonically
increasing over mn, breaking 5% at mn = 65, 90, 150 respectively for L = 250, 500, 1000.
By comparison, if we test PV κ = 1/2 against κ > 1/2 then rejection frequencies are
above 90% for mn ≥ 40 and above 95% for mn ≥ 45 cross L ∈ {250, 500, 1000}.
In practice a policy for selecting the number of bids near the reserve price mn must
be entertained. A reasonably clear picture emerges from our simulation study. In both
cases of PV and CV data, and across the number of auctions L ∈ {250, 500, 1000}, if the
number mn is chosen from the range {40, ..., 65} then empirical size is close to or below
5% and empirical power is above 90%.
4.3 Tail Inference - Bidder Asymmetries
Now consider the second experiment based on an asymmetric model with interdependent
values, resulting in bids under CV. By Proposition 3 the index κ = 1 for pooled bids, and
κj > 1 for at most one group j ∈ {1, 2}. See Figure 4 for the case L = 250 and Hill and
Shneyerov (2010) for L = 500 or 1000.
The Hill-plots in panel (a) reveal the well known small sample bias of the Hill (1975)
estimator: all κ̂−1mn > 1 where theory predicts κ−1 < 1. Nevertheless, the 90% confidence
bands contain κ−1 = 2 only at the smallest fractiles values mn ∈ {5, 6, 7} when L = 250
and only at mn = 5 when L = 500 or 1000. Similarly, the tests of CV κ = 1 against κ < 1
generate rejection frequencies above 5% for fractiles mn starting at 30, 34, 52 respectively
for L = 250, 500, 1000, while tests of PV κ = 1/2 against κ > 1/2 lead to frequencies
above 70% for all mn ≥ 20 across all L, and above 80% for all mn ≥ 20 and L = 500, 1000.
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A tighter optimal fractile range is therefore revealed to be safely mn ∈ {20, ..., 30}. Thus,
even with known estimator bias, under CV we obtain the same qualitative test results
with symmetric or asymmetric bidders.
5 Empirical Application: BCTS
Prior to 2003, the Ministry of Forests40 sold some timber rights through auctions under
the Small Business Forest Enterprise Program (SBFEP) first studied by Paarsch (1997).
In 2003, this program was transformed into BC Timber Sales (BCTS), an independent
organization whose aim is to generate the best possible financial return from publicly-
owned timber, provide timber harvesting opportunities, and set a credible reference point
for the price of harvested timber.
The BCTS sells timber through first-price, sealed-bid auctions, and it has developed a
complex system of reserve prices, also known in the industry as upset rates. The reserve
prices are set in dollars per cubic meter of timber. Bids must be submitted as bonus
payments, i.e. the dollar amounts per cubic meter over and above the reserve prices.
Negative bonus bids are not allowed. Moreover, there are auctions that end up being
canceled due to no bids submitted. In fact, over the period covered by our dataset, there
were 33 such auctions, or about 5.4% of all auctions conducted. Paarsch (1997) also argues
convincingly that non-participation in SFBEP is explained by binding reserve prices. His
summary statistics show that the mean number of potential bidders (92.39) exceeds by
a large margin the mean number of actual bidders (3.29).41 So it is very likely that
the reserve prices are strictly binding in BCTS, which is a necessary condition for the
applicability of our testing approach.
As we have already mentioned our approach is theoretically valid in an unconditional
form (see Corollary 1). However, it might be desirable to incorporate relevant auction
characteristics in order to increase the power of the test. In BCTS, the reserve prices
are set using a pricing model that accounts for timber tract heterogeneity and uses the
relevant information from comparable past sales. The variables used by the BCTS for this
40Now known as the Ministry of Forests and Range.
41See Table 4 on p. 353 in Paarsch (1997).
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purpose include average log selling prices in the region, net cruise volume, estimated species
composition on the tract, and measures of distance to the closest major location (e.g.
Vancouver, Nanaimo, Prince Rupert, etc.). The list of variables is not long, but probably
detailed enough to capture the main aspects of auction heterogeneity, so normalizing the
bids by the reserve price is likely to homogenize the bids to a large extent. For this reason,
we do not incorporate any covariates in the empirical implementation of our test beyond
the normalization of bids by the reserve prices.
Our data were collected from the BCTS website.42 The raw data is in the form of PDF
files for each sale. We have all bonus bids, the reserve price, the identities of the bidders
and also data on the characteristics of the sale; e.g., the location, the species of trees
present, slope, and so forth. The reserve prices and bids are quoted per 1m3 of timber.
Our dataset comprises of all auctions conducted from January 14, 2004 to December 14,
2006. The sample of auctions that have received bids contains 611 auctions and a total of
1874 bids. For each auction, the reserve price as well as the bonus bids are available for
all bidders. The summary statistics of the sample are shown in Table 1. It is evident that
there is substantial heterogeneity in timber tract values, as reflected by the variances of
both bids and reserve prices. The heterogeneity persists even when bids are normalized
by the reserve prices.
Why Should We Expect Common Values in BCTS? Paarsch (1997) assumed a private-
values model in his study of SBFEP, the predecessor of BCTS. However, common value
uncertainty is likely to be present in BCTS at least to some extent. First, the auction
design has changed. In BCTS, even though bidders pay for the actual volume of timber on
the tract, their bids must specify a single price for all timber, whereas in SBFEP, bidders
were allowed to enter separate bids for each species. To the extent that the composition
of timber on the tract is uncertain at the time of bidding, this new design increased the
common value uncertainty for the bidders. Another factor at play over the period covered
by our data was the epidemic of Mountain Pine Beetle in BC. The epidemic affected
the predominant merchantable timber species, the Lodgepole Pine. Timber quality was
42http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/bcts/, accessed in January 2007.
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affected in a manner that was likely to be tract-specific, and this contributed to the
common value uncertainty in the auction.43
Can Bidders Be Treated Symmetrically? Our testing approach has been developed
under the assumption that bidders are symmetric. Paarsch (1997) also treated bidders
symmetrically in his study of SBFEP. But how well is symmetry supported in BCTS? Since
one of the goals of BCTS is to obtain market value for the timber by promoting entry,
the eligibility requirements in BCTS were somewhat relaxed. In particular, the eligibility
is no longer restricted to small logging firms. In principle, any entity in BC that (i) is
an individual 19 years of age or older or (ii) a corporation registered in British Columbia;
and, has one year logging experience or own a timber processing facility, can participate
for a two-year period. by paying a small registration fee (250 Canadian dollars). But
many features of the SBFEP have been preserved in BCTS; e.g., the tracts are still quite
small and, as important, no firm is allowed to hold more than five licenses at the same
time. This alone is likely to limit the participation of large mills and timber processing
companies.
In our data, we find no evidence of major players. Figure 5(a) depicts the frequencies
of participation by firms in the auctions over the period covered by our data. About half
of the bidders participated in only one auction. Even the maximum of the participation
rate is very small, 25 out of 611 auctions, or the rate of about 0.02. This also implies
that information asymmetries, for example due to superior information about the beetle
infestation, are unlikely in this market, and bidders can still be treated symmetrically.
5.1 Test Results
Figure 5(b) depicts the histogram of normalized bonus bids. The histogram exhibits an
overall declining pattern consistent with our findings in the numerical examples (Figure 1),
for both PV and CV environments.44 There is some evidence of bid clustering around the
43According to an estimate by the BC Ministry of Forests and Range, since late 1990s beetles have
killed over 620 million cubic meters of timber, covering over 130,000 square kilometers. Some information
about the Mountain Pine Beetle epidemic in BC can be found in the Mountain Pine Beetle Action Plan,
available at the BC Ministry of Forests and Range website, at http://www.for.gov.bc.ca/hfp/mountain_
pine_beetle/MPB_ActionPlan_ProgressReport.pdf (accessed on 28 April, 2009).
44Roise (2005) presents a similar pattern in his Figure 8, without normalizing bids by the reserve price.
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reserve price. This could be evidence of a PV environment, but could also be a statistical
artifact, especially since our numerical examples have also identified some clustering under
CV.
The tail index test however provides robust and conclusive evidence. The results of
the estimation of the tail index κ−1 and the t-test are reported in Figure 6. We plot
the asymptotic 90% confidence bands κ̂−1mn ± 1.64 × σ̂mn|L/
√
mn over the same fractile
window mn ∈ {5, ..., 200} used in the simulation study, and plot p-values from the t-tests
of PV κ = 1/2 against κ > 1/2, and CV κ = 1 against κ < 1. Related plots based on the
variance estimator κ̂−2mn are presented in Hill and Shneyerov (2010).
The CV value κ = 1 lies within the confidence band for over 70% of the fractiles mn ∈
{5, ..., 200}, while the PV value κ = 1/2 never lies in the band. In particular, there is no
evidence at any fractile mn for PV: p-values for the t-test of PV are no larger than .0045.
Conversely, when CV is the null hypothesis p-values are predominantly above 5%-10%.
Recall when mn is restricted to the range {40, ..., 65} simulation evidence for symmetric
heterogeneous bidders shows the kernel estimator σ̂2
mn|L leads to empirical sizes at or below
5%, and empirical power at or above 90%. Similarly, the optimal range under asymmetry
and homogeneity is {20, ..., 30}. In the former range the CV value κ = 1 lies within the
90% confidence band for over 88% of the mn. In particular, for the test of PV κ = 1/2
against κ > 1/2 the average p-value is .0004, and the percent of mn on which we reject
the null of PV in favor of CV is 100%.45 Similarly, for the one-sided test of CV κ = 1
against κ < 1 the average p-value is 15.5%, and the percent of mn on which we reject the
null of CV in favor of PV is 7.7%. In the restricted range {20, ..., 30} the test results are
even more stark: if the null is CV the average p-value is 75.7% and we do not reject the
null for any mn, and if the null is PV the p-value average is 2.6E-07 and we reject the null
for every mn.
Although the t-ratio τmn works exceptionally well within the broad range mn ∈
{5, ..., 200}, if we take into consideration (i) the superlative performance of τmn on the
restricted range mn ∈ {40, ..., 65} and the strong performance on {20, ..., 30}, and (ii) the
45A more appropriate test statistic may be supλ∈Λ |τmn(λ)| where, e.g., mn(λ) = [λn/ln(n)] with λ
restricted to a compact subset Λ of [0, 1]. A Gaussian weak limit theory exists for κ̂−1mn(λ) but a weak limit
for σ̂2mn(λ)|L is not yet available (Hill (2009, 2010)). See the discussion in Footnote 34.
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empirical evidence within those ranges, then we conclude the evidence overwhelmingly
points to a CV strategy within BTCS data.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have developed a new tail-index nonparametric, asymptotically most
powerful test of common values in first-price auctions and applied it to BC Timber Sales,
an important institution both in the economy of British Columbia and in the larger context
of the United States-Canada soft lumber dispute.
The test is based on auction theory, but is reduced-form in the sense that it is based
on the properties of bids distribution, which is directly observable. The test exploits the
difference in the clustering of bids near the reserve price. A measure of such clustering is
provided by the tail index. We have shown that the tail index of the bid distribution is
equal to one-half under private values, but is equal to one if there is a common-value com-
ponent in bidders’ valuations. The estimation of the tail index is a well-studied problem
in econometrics, where the Hill (1975) estimator is by far the most widely-used method.
Nevertheless, the available asymptotic results do not cover our setting of imbalanced pan-
els with stochastic dimension and conditional sub-sample heterogeneity, and few results
treat inference in the non-i.i.d. case. Our econometric contributions are to develop a non-
parametric asymptotic inference framework for the Hill (1975) estimator in this setting,
show arbitrary within-auction dependence does not alter the asymptotic distribution rel-
ative to the i.i.d. case, and show kernel estimator methods greatly improve small sample
inference. These methods are potentially useful in other contexts where dependent hetero-
geneous data and a stochastic sample size are encountered. In this regard applicable fields
are quite diverse, including marked point process in finance, and spatial point processes
at the heart of stochastic geometry.46
Our nonparametric tail-index test has uncovered the presence of common values in
46A marked point process in finance may denote the date and value (e.g. price, volume) of a traded
asset jointly within a deterministic window of time. The number of marks (i.e. trades) observed is
therefore random. This generalizes the setting of a first-price auction, while the theory developed here
easily extends to a general class of dependent heterogeneous processes (cf. Hill (2010, 2011b)). Forestry
growth and earthquake magnitudes in space and time are further examples. See, e.g., Stoyan, Kendall,
and Mecke (1987) and Jacobsen (2006).
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BCTS. Simply put, the bids do not cluster around the reserve price as much as they
should if values were purely private. Why is this important? Recall that BCTS pursues
a goal of obtaining the maximal revenue for the Crown, and currently uses first-price,
sealed-bid auction mechanism. To the extent that common values are present, theory
(Milgrom and Weber (1982)) suggests that BCTS would obtain a higher expected revenue
if it adopted an ascending-bid auction. Shneyerov (2006) proposes nonparametric methods
for estimation and bounding of such counter-factual revenues. In addition, Tang (2011)
has recently developed nonparametric bounds for expected revenues under counter-factual
reserve prices. An application of these methods to BC Timber Sales would be an inter-
esting topic for future research.
Appendix A: Variance and Omitted Proofs
In this appendix we characterize the Hill (1975) estimator scale σ2
mn|L required for
our test, and present omitted proofs. We first summarize the major properties of bids
governed by our DGP for the sake of reference. Recall {b∗t }nt=1 is the sample of stacked
bids b∗
i,l
, and the sigma-field induced by observable auction sizes:
￿L := σ
￿
{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1
￿
.
The following is implied by Corollary 1 and therefore (24).
A1 (conditional tail) The left-tail behavior of b∗t satisfies for every t
G∗ (b|￿L) := P (b∗t < b|￿L) = cL × bκ (1 + O(bκ)) , κ > 0, as b ↓0 (32)
where the ￿L-measurable random variable cL > 0 a.s.
Bids across auctions are independent.
A2 (cross-auction independence) b∗
i,l
is possibly dependent over i within auction l, and
independent across auctions l.
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Finally, signal symmetry and the DGP of Section 3.1 ensure stationarity and ex-





observable auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}, depends only on ￿L and on whether the
bidders are the same i = j or different i ￿= j: in particular, P (b∗
i,l
≤ b1, b∗j,l ≤ b2|￿L) =
P (b∗
r,l
≤ b1, b∗s,l ≤ b2|￿L) for every pair i ￿= j and r ￿= s.
A3 (stationarity and exchangeability) Bids b∗
i,l
within auction l are stationary and ex-
changeable, conditional on observable auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}. Uncondition-
ally, bids are stationary.
A.1 Variance











|￿L)2, by the con-
struction E[T (L)
mn,i,l
|￿L] = 0, and by the fact that bids b∗i,l are independent across auctions




































|￿L] depends only on the auction size nl and whether
the bids come from the same bidder i = j or different bidders i ￿= j. Further, in auctions of
size nl ≥ 2 exchangeability implies bid dependence between any two bidders is the same,















if nl ≥ 2 for some l = 1, ..., L (34)
= 0 if nl = 1 for all l = 1, ..., L.



















































We use the following result to characterize the first conditional expectation in (35). Notice
each limit is in unconditional probability: in Appendix A.2 we prove each claim by first
conditioning on auction sizes, and then by exploiting dominated convergence.
Lemma 8 (n/mn)E[(ln(qn/b∗t ))+|￿L]
p→ κ−1, (n/mn)E[(U (L)mn,t)2|￿L]
p→ 2κ−2, (n/mn)E[(I(L)mn,t)2|￿L]
p→ 1 and (n/mn)E[(T (L)mn,t)2|￿L]
p→ κ−2.
Combine decomposition (35) and Lemma 8 to characterize the unconditional proba-
bility limit of σ2
mn|L.
Lemma 9 The conditional variance satisfies unconditionally σ2
mn|L






The conditional variance asymptotically reduces to the asymptotic variance κ−2 in the
i.i.d. case plus a term capturing total within auction bid dependence near the reserve
price. The next result suffices to prove plimL→∞{E[C(L)mn,l|￿L]} = 0 under our DGP (see
the proof of Theorem 6).
Lemma 10 The joint bid density g(b1, b2|￿L) satisfies lim sup0≤b1,b2≤qn{g(b1, b2|￿L) /
(g(b1|￿L)g(b2|￿L))} ≤ K on ￿L − a.e.
A.2 Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4. A variation on Hsing’s (1991: p.1548) argument suffices. Under
the DGP conditional tail decay (24) applies by an application of Proposition 1 and its
consequence (21). Under (24) b∗t has a regularly varying conditional tail with index κ > 0,
and by (25) the thresholds qn and fractiles mn satisfy (n/mn)G∗(qn|￿L)
p→ 1 on ￿L −a.e.




































































Proof of Theorem 6. By Lemma 10 we have lim sup0≤b1,b2≤qn{g(b1, b2|￿L) / (g(b1|￿L)g(b2|￿L))}
≤ K on ￿L − a.e. Now apply dominated convergence and tail-array moment bounds ver-












































































l=1 nl(nl − 1)/
￿
L




= 0 for C(L)
mn,l
defined in (34). In conjunction with Lemma 9 this proves σ̂2
mn|L
p→ κ−2.
The claim m1/2n (κ̂−1mn − κ−1)/κ̂−1mn
d→ N(0, 1) now follows from Theorem 5 and Cramér’s
Theorem. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 7. Under the stated assumptions and the arguments leading to
Theorem 5, all conditions of Hill (2010)’s Lemmas B.8 and B.9 hold for bids b∗t conditioned
on observable auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}. Therefore P (σ̂2mn|L > 0|￿L) = 1 and
limL→∞ P (|σ̂2mn|L/σ
2
mn|L − 1| > ε|￿L) = 0 ∀ε > 0 on ￿L − a.e. See especially the proof of






p→ 1 as claimed. Q.E.D.

























































Use conditional power law A1 with properties of regularly varying functions (e.g. Leadbet-
ter, Lindgren, and Rootzen (1983)), and the threshold construction (n/mn)G∗(qn|￿L)
p→ 1





n = (mn/n) × (1 + op(1)) on ￿L − a.e. Second, choose any p ∈ N. By
Fubini’s Theorem and bounded convergence, E[(ln(qn/b∗t ))
p








du =P (b∗t < qn|￿L) ×
ˆ ∞
0








p→ p!κ−p on ￿L − a.e.

























Combine the three properties with mn/n a.s.→ 0 to prove each claim. For example, (n/mn)
× E[(U (L)
mnt
)2|￿L] = (n/mn)E[(log(qn/b∗t )2+|￿L] −(n/mn)(E[(log(qn/b∗t )+|￿L])2 ∼ 2κ−2 −
(n/mn)(mn/n)2κ−2





Similarly, together we obtain (n/mn)E[(T (L)mn,t)2|￿L] ∼ {κ−2 + κ−2} + {κ−2 − op(1)}
− 2κ−2 + 2κ−2(mn/n)
p→ κ−2 on ￿L − a.e. hence (n/mn)E[(T (L)mn,t)2|￿L]
p→ κ−2. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 10. By the arguments leading to Corollary 1, under our DGP we may
replicate the proof of Proposition 1 for bids conditional on auction sizes {{nl}Ll=1 : nl ≥ 1}.
In particular, first assume PV and imitate the proof of Proposition 1 leading to (8) to
deduce bidder signal distribution smoothness Assumption 9(iii) and density boundedness
from below Assumption 9(vi) implies
P
￿




S1 ≤ β−1l (b
1/2





where βl : Dε → R , βl(b) := β(b; rl, xl, Nl), with β defined by (7). Note that βl(·) is a
diffeomorphism, i.e. is smooth with a smooth inverse β−1. Also denote, respectively as
fl(s) and fl(s1, s2), the density of the signal S1,l and the joint density of signals (S1,l, S2,l),
conditional on (rl, xl, Nl). Then the joint bid density g(b1, b2|￿L) satisfies by iterated
expectations





































































Assumption 9(iii) implies that a joint signal density fl (s1, s2) is bounded from above
sups1,s2∈[s,s]{fl(s1, s2)} ≤ K a.s., and density positiveness Assumption 9(vi) ensures bound-
edness from below, hence infs∈[s,s]{fl(s)} > 0 a.s. Moreover, being a diffeomorphism, the










































≤ K on : ￿L − a.e.
The proof for CV is essentially identical by replicating arguments leading to (6). In
equations (38) and (39) replace β(s) with the smooth bidding strategy B∗(s) from the
proof of Proposition 1, and replace
√
bi with bi. Q.E.D.
Appendix B: Robustness Checks
Proof of Proposition 2. A change of variables αi(b) − b ≡ φi(τ), τ ≡
√
b − r, and a




r + τ2 + φ1 (τ)
￿













r + τ2 + φ2 (τ)
￿










We first show that we cannot have as τ ↓ 0
φ￿j (τ) → ∞ (42)
or
φ￿j (τ) → 0. (43)
Fix one one of the groups, say j = 1. (The argument is symmetric for j = 2.) To
rule out (42), note first that L’Hopital’s rule then implies τ
φ1(τ) → 0. Also τ/φ2(τ) → 0,
for otherwise the r.h.s. of (41) would be negative for all sufficiently small τ > 0, and the
slope φ￿2 (τ) would also be negative. In view of φ2(0) = 0, this would imply that α2(b) < b
for some b > r sufficiently close to r, which is impossible. But if both τ/φ1(τ) → 0 and
τ/φ2(τ) → 0, then from (40) we have φ￿1 (τ) → 0, contrary to what we assumed in (42).
49




r + τ2 + φ1 (τ)
￿













r + τ2 + φ2 (τ)
￿







− (N1 − 1)
￿
− 2τ. (45)
Since φ￿1(τ) → 0, we obtain τφ1(τ) → ∞ by L’Hopital’s rule. Then our assumption (43)




− (N2 − 1) → 0,
φ1 (τ)
φ2 (τ)
→ N2 − 1
N2
. (46)
Also, we must have τ/φ2(τ) → ∞, for otherwise we would have from (40) φ￿1(τ) < 0 for




− (N1 − 1) → 0,
φ2 (τ)
φ1 (τ)
→ N1 − 1
N1
. (47)
Now observe that the product of the left-hand sides of (46) and (47) is equal to 1, while
the limit of the product of their right-hand sides is (N1−1)(N2−1)
N1N2
< 1, a contradiction.
With the possibilities in (42) and (43) eliminated, it follows that φ￿
j
(τ) converge to
finite, positive limits: limτ→0 φ￿j(τ) ∈ (0, ∞).47 Therefore, the derivatives φ￿j(τ) are




, and the bid
distributions are given by (9), we obtain G
j





r + x2 + φj(x)
￿
− Fj(r) is a twice continuously differentiable around 0 func-
tion, with Hj(0) = 0, H ￿j(0) > 0. The result in the proposition follows from the mean






, we have Hj(
√










b − r . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Evaluating the r.h.s. of (15) and (16) at b = r and taking
into account (17) yields existence of the (right) derivatives α￿
j
(r) ∈ [0, ∞). Moreover,





(r) > 0 for at least one of the groups. Indeed, if e.g. α￿1 (r) = 0, then
N2
v2 [α1 (r) , α2 (r)] − r
− N2 − 1
v1 [α1 (r) , α2 (r)] − r
= 0,
⇒ N1
v1 [α1 (r) , α2 (r)] − r
− N1 − 1
v2 [α1 (r) , α2 (r)] − r
= 1






− (N1 − 1)
￿
> 0









βjfj(α̃j)(αj(b) − αj(r)) = (1 + o(1)) ×
2￿
j=1
βjfj(r)α￿j(r) × (b − r),
(48)
where βj ≡ NjN
1
1−Fj(r) > 0. Because α
￿
j
(r) ≥ 0, with a strict inequality for some j ∈
{1, 2}, it follows that in (48),
￿2
j=1 βjfj(r)α￿j(r) > 0, and therefore the tail index of the
corresponding normalized bid distribution G∗(b) is κ = 1. Q.E.D.
Drainage Tract Model. This is the model considered in the classic study by Hen-
dricks and Porter (1988). There is an informed bidder and n uninformed bidders. The
informed bidder knows the value of the object V , a random variable drawn from CDF F
with support [v, v̄], and with continuously differentiable density f bounded away from 0
on the support. The uninformed bidder doesn’t have any information concerning V . The
payoff to the informed from winning the auction is V , while the payoff to an uninformed
is V − c, where c ≥ 0 may reflect production cost differences between the firms. There is
a binding reserve price r ∈ (v, v̄).
For simplicity, we assume that there is one uninformed bidder (n = 1); however,
the analysis can be generalized. Hendricks and Porter (1988) characterize Bayesian-Nash






E [V |V ≤ v] − c, v > v̂
r, v ∈ [r, v̂]
0, v < r
(49)
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(Here we follow Hendricks and Porter (1988) and assume that the bidder with valuation
below the reserve bids 0.) The threshold v̂ is found from the break-even condition of the
uninformed bidder at the reserve, E [V |V ≤ v̂] − c = r. The uninformed bidder adopts a










, b ∈ (r, E[V ] − c]
F (r), b ∈ [0, r]









, b ∈ (r, v̄ − c]
ϕ(r), b ∈ [0, r]












. (If c = 0, it can be verified that ϕ(h) =
F (h).)
Note that the distribution G∗
I
has a probability mass at the reserve, equal to F (v̂) −
F (r). On the contrary, the distribution G∗
U
is continuous at the reserve. We therefore
focus on the tail index of both distributions with the bids at (and below) reserve price











1−ϕ(r) . We now
show that both of these distributions have tail index equal to 1:κI = κU = 1. First,









F (s)ds ∈ (0, ∞). Therefore the right-derivative of the inverse bidding
strategy at b = r is also positive, dσ
∗−1(r+0)
db
∈ (0, ∞). Since we have assumed that F has
a positive density, it follows that the cumulative distribution G∗∗
I
has a right-continuous
density at b = r, and therefore its tail index at b = r is κI = 1.
Turning to the uninformed bidders, we first verify that, for c > 0,











while for c = 0, ϕ￿ (v̂) = f (v̂). In both cases, we can see that ϕ￿ (v̂) ∈ (0, ∞). We can see
that the right-density g∗∗
U
(r + 0) = ϕ￿ (v̂) dσ
∗−1(r+0)
db
∈ (0, ∞), and therefore κU = 1.
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Figure 1: Bidding strategies and bid densities for CV (left panel) and PV (right panel)
models.










Figure 2: Bidding strategies in the asymmetric example. The lower curve corresponds to
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(a) The tail index estimator κ̂−1mn . b(·) denotes
the asymptotic 90% confidence band based on the
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Tail Fractile m(n) 
(b) Test rejection frequencies: CV against PV. r(·) is
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(c) Test rejection frequencies: CV against PV. r(·) is
the rejection frequency of the null of PV at the 5% level
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(b) The histogram of normalized bonus bids.












(a) The tail index estimator κ̂−1mn for BCTS data and 90% con-
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(c) P-values for the t-test of CV κ = 1 on BCTS
data.
Figure 6: BCTS: tail index test
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